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value of the note, as the court suggests, but its basis.  The Ninth
Circuit’s position that a shareholder note given in a tax-free
exchange to a controlled corporation should receive a basis
seems wide of the mark in terms of well-established tax law.
The Second Circuit decision
The Peracchi court, while following somewhat different
reasoning, reached the same essential conclusion as Lessinger
v. Commissioner14 decided nearly a decade earlier.  In
Lessinger, no gain was recognized on the transfer of the
taxpayer’s sole proprietorship assets and liabilities to the
taxpayer’s wholly-owned corporation even though the
liabilities exceeded the basis.  The Lessinger court held that the
gain was eliminated by the shareholder’s contribution of a
personal promissory note.  The Lessinger decision was widely
criticized at the time as an attempt to find a solution to a
taxpayer’s unfortunate plight.
Possible solutions to the problem
As a planning matter, if the problem of indebtedness in
excess of basis is spotted in time, several solutions are
possible.15
•  Halt the transfer before conveyance of the assets and
liabilities to the corporation.
•  Contribute cash to the corporation sufficient to elevate the
aggregate basis to the level of indebtedness.
•  Leave assets with high indebtedness and low basis in the
hands of the transferor.
•  Arrange with the creditors for some of the indebtedness to
remain with the transferor and be secured with stock received
in the exchange rather than with the transferred assets.
Policy solutions
The case of Lessinger v. Commissioner 16 could be dismissed
as an aberrational result from a court displaying judicial
sympathy for a taxpayer caught in a trap of tax liability from a
seemingly innocent transfer.  The decision in Peracchi17 makes
it more difficult to ignore the problem.
One possibility is for IRS to recognize a negative basis in
such situations, with recognition of the gain postponed, a result
which the Service has loathed in the past.18  Another is for
Congress to amend I.R.C. § 357(c) to make it clear that the
reading of the subsection by the Second and Ninth Circuits is
incorrect.  That policy solution seems to be a remote
possibility, at best.  The other policy solution is to concede that
promissory notes, even to a controlled corporation, can be
viewed as contributing basis to absorb liabilities taken over in
the transfer.19
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. The debtor livestock
corporation and a grain trading corporation were owned by the
same person. The shareholder caused funds to be withdrawn
from the grain trading corporation to meet margin calls for both
corporations. The shareholder was not authorized to make this
withdrawal and the bank sought recovery of the funds. The
shareholder then withdrew funds from the debtor’s account and
paid them to the commodity broker who transferred the funds
to the grain trading corporation’s account, restoring the
improperly withdrawn funds. The bankruptcy trustee sought
recovery of the funds, under Section 550(a)(1) from the bank as
an “entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.” The court
held that the bank did not meet this requirement because the
bank received the funds transferred. Because the funds were
first transferred to the commodity broker, the bank was also not
an initial transferee from whom recovery could have been made
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under Section 550(a)(1). Although the result in this case is fair,
the holding opens a loophole to debtors to circumvent the
avoidable transfer rules by simply transferring funds to an
intermediary which then transfers the funds to the intended
transferee. Query: Is not the purpose of Section 550(a)(1) to
allow recovery from the entity which received the benefit and
thus had the means to repay the avoided transfer? In re KZK
Livestock, Inc., 221 B.R. 483 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. As part of the debtors’
reorganization plan, the debtors entered into a sale and debt
refinancing loan and incurred expenses. The debtors supplied
information about the total expenses without itemizing the
amount and purpose of each expense. The debtors argued that
all of the expenses were deductible as administrative expenses
because the sale/loan transaction was part of the bankruptcy
reorganization. The IRS argued that some of the expenses were
business expenses but the expenses associated with the
refinancing were to be capitalized over the loan term. The court
held that the burden of proof on the character of the expenses
was on the debtors because the debtors raised the issue in a
motion to determine tax liability. The court held that, because
the debtors failed to provide detailed evidence of the loan/sale
transaction and the purpose of each expenditure, the IRS
determination of the allowed deductions would be upheld.  In
re Carden, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,686 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1998).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had filed a joint income
tax return for 1988 with the debtor’s nondebtor spouse. The tax
claim for that year included self-employment taxes. After the
debtor filed for bankruptcy, the IRS sought collection of the
taxes from the nondebtor spouse and the debtor sought
enforcement of the stay against nondebtor co-obligors on
consumer debts. The IRS argued that taxes were not consumer
debts. The court held that the taxes were a consumer debt
because the debtor had no profit motive from incurring the tax
debt and the income subject to the taxes was used for personal
expenses. In re Westberry, 219 B.R. 976 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1998).
DISCHARGE. The debtor did not file income tax returns for
1981 and 1982. In June 1986, the IRS constructed a substitute
return and filed a deficiency notice for taxes due based on the
substitute return. The debtor supplied the IRS with sufficient
information to determine the correct taxes and eventually
reached a stipulated Tax Court decision for the amount of taxes
owed. No Form 1040 was ever filed for either year. Under
I.R.C. § 6020(a) a return is deemed filed when a taxpayer
discloses information necessary to prepare a return and signs a
disclosure statement. The evidence was unclear as to whether
the debtor ever signed any disclosure statement. The debtor
filed for bankruptcy in September 1992 and received a
discharge. The issue was whether the debtor’s cooperation with
the IRS was sufficient to make the 1981 and 1982 taxes
dischargeable under Section 523. The court held that the
information supplied by the debtor was sufficient to make the
taxes dischargeable. In re Ashe, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,675 (C.D. Calif. 1998).
The debtor failed to file tax returns for 1983 through 1989
and the IRS issued deficiency notices for taxes for those years
based on W-2 forms supplied by the debtor’s employer. The
debtor appealed the deficiency to the Tax Court and eventually
entered into a stipulation with the IRS as to the tax liability for
those years. The IRS then assessed the taxes and within a
month of the assessment, the debtor filed income tax returns
which contained only the amount of wages and the stipulated
amount of taxes due. The IRS argued that the returns were
insufficient for Section 523(a)(1)(B) because the returns were
filed after the taxes were assessed. The court held that the
returns were effective under Section 523 because the returns
were in compliance with the stipulations in the Tax Court case
and Section 523(a)(1)(B) had no requirement that the returns be
filed before any assessment. In re Pierchoski, 220 B.R. 20
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998).
The debtor filed income tax returns for 1979, 1980 and 1981
but the returns contained only the debtor’s name, address,
social security number and signature. The court held that these
returns were not sufficient under Section 523(a)(1)(B) to make
the taxes dischargeable. In re Hillman, 221 B.R. 281 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1998).
SET OFF. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in 1988 and paid
FUTA taxes for 1987 and 1989 in 1991. In 1992, the debtor
paid state unemployment taxes for 1987 and 1989 and filed a
claim for refund of FUTA taxes for those years. The estate
sought recovery of the refund and the IRS sought to offset the
refund against other tax claims filed in the bankruptcy case.
The issue was the date the refund claim arose, when the FUTA
taxes were originally due, when the FUTA taxes were paid or
when the state tax was paid. The court held that no refund
claim existed until the state unemployment taxes were paid.
Because the state taxes were paid post-petition, the refund
claim was a post-petition claim not entitled to offset the pre-
petition tax claims. In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,676 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. In a proceeding
before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, hedge-to-
arrive contracts were determined to be futures contracts subject
to the Commodity Exchange Act. The respondents were an
unregistered grain marketing consulting firm, a registered
introducing broker firm and an individual who owned both
firms and who was a registered associated person with an
unrelated registered introducing broker firm. The respondents
held seminars, published a newsletter and advised clients about
using hedge-to-arrive contracts. The seminars promoted the
HTAs as risk-free and failed to explain the risks from
increasing grain prices and the inability to roll over the
contracts several times. The CFTC ruled that the respondents
were acting as commodity trading advisors and that the HTAs
were off-exchange futures contracts; therefore, the respondents
committed fraud, under Section 4(b) of the Commodity
Exchange Act in misrepresenting the risks of the contracts. The
CFTC ruled that the HTAs met all the factors of a futures
contract in that the contracts provided “an effective means of
discharge or offset that was, in practice, used routinely to
liquidate the contract for cash with no delivery of grain
required. … In addition, the contract was marketed, entered
into and structured as a means of capturing price movements in
the futures markets, not as a vehicle for delivery.” The CFTC
also held that the HTAs did not meet the exception provided for
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cash forward contracts with set delivery dates, because the
deferral of delivery was not made “to accommodate
commercial convenience or necessity” but was made routinely
to capture price movements in the futures market. In the
Matter of Competitive Strategies For Agriculture, Ltd.,
CFTC Docket No. 98-4 (Aug. 27, 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim regulations
amending the brucellosis regulations concerning the interstate
movement of cattle by changing the classification of Florida
from Class Free to Class A. 63 Fed. Reg. 44544 (Aug. 20,
1998).
SHARED APPRECIATION AGREEMENTS. The FSA
has adopted as final regulations governing payments of
appreciation under shared appreciation agreements. The
appreciation payments are due when (1) the agreement expires;
(2) the property or a portion of the property (in which case a
portion of the appreciation is due) is disposed of; (3) the loans
are satisfied; (4) the borrower ceases farm operations or no
longer has farm income; or (5) the notes are accelerated. 63
Fed. Reg. 6627 (Feb. 10, 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CLAIMS. The decedent had made an agreement with an
unrelated person to provide personal services to the decedent in
exchange for one-third of the decedent’s estate. After eight
years of service, however, the decedent decided to remove the
caregiver from the will. After the decedent’s death, the
caregiver filed a claim against the estate for one-third of the
estate. The caregiver received a jury verdict for $75,000 as
compensation for the services rendered but the caregiver
received $400,000 under a settlement with the estate. The IRS
argued that the estate was entitled to a deduction only for
$75,000 because the jury verdict determined the value of the
caregiver’s claim. The court held that the entire amount paid
was allowed as a deduction from the estate because, at the time
of the agreement between the decedent and the caregiver, both
parties gave full and adequate consideration for their portion of
the agreement. The court held that the caregiver’s promise to
provide lifetime services to the decedent was sufficient
consideration for the decedent’s promise to bequeath one-third
of the estate. The court held that events which occurred after
the execution of the agreement were not relevant in
determining whether full and adequate consideration was given
at the time of the agreement. Estate of Wilson v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1998-309.
DISCLAIMER. The decedent died intestate, because the
decedent’s will could not be found, and the surviving spouse
and the decedent’s father decided to take the decedent’s estate
under the provisions of the prior will. Property which passed to
the father under the state laws of inheritance was renounced by
the father in a written irrevocable and unqualified statement.
The spouse executed a trust in which all of the decedent’s farm
property passed. Under the trust, the farm property was
operated as it had been when the decedent was alive, as a
partnership with the father. Therefore, the disclaimed property
passed to the spouse’s trust. A short time later, the trust and the
father exchanged properties so that the father’s property was all
in one county near the father’s residence. The IRS argued that
the disclaimer was not effective because the father received
consideration or other value in exchange for the disclaimer. The
court found that the transactions were all separate and not made
in exchange for each other. The disclaimer was made in order
to remove the decedent’s property from the father’s estate and
the trust was formed to maintain the decedent’s business
operations. The estate was eligible for a marital deduction for
the disclaimed property which passed to the trust for the
surviving spouse. Estate of Lute v. United States, 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,321 (D. Neb. 1998).
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. The decedent owned
several properties in joint tenancy with another person who was
the decedent’s domestic companion. The companion had
separate income which was commingled with the decedent’s in
bank accounts. The companion also provided services for some
of the properties which were residential rental properties. The
decedent’s estate claimed only one-half of the value of each
property in the decedent’s gross estate, claiming that the
companion provided either money or services to the properties.
The court held that where the estate had proved the value of the
companion’s services and the amount of money contributed to
the cost of the property, the value of the property included in
the estate would be reduced by those amounts. The decedent’s
residence was not decreased by the services provided by the
companion because the companion also used the property as a
residence. The estate also sought to decrease the value of the
decedent’s interests in the property by a discount for a
fractional interest. The court held that I.R.C. § 2040 had no
provision for reduction of value of estate joint tenancy property
for a fractional interest. Estate of Fratini v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-308.
PENSION PLAN. The decedent owned an interest in a
pension plan and had named the decedent’s estate as sole
beneficiary. The surviving spouse was the executrix and, with
the other heirs, executed disclaimers of various interests in the
estate such that the spouse would receive a pecuniary bequest
from the estate. The spouse, as executrix, then caused the
amount in the pension plan to be distributed directly to the
spouse with a rollover to an IRA in the spouse’s name. The IRS
ruled that the pension plan funds would not be included in the
spouse’s gross income. Ltr. Rul. 9835005, May 22, 1998.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The IRS
has announced that it acquiesces in Est. of Hoover v. Comm’r,
69 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'g,  102 T.C. 777 (1994). The
Tax Court had held that an estate could not claim a minority
discount if a special use valuation election is made. The
appellate court reversed, holding that no statute or regulation
prevented the use of discounting factors in determining the fair
market value of interests in partnerships for purposes of the
special use valuation election where the $750,000 maximum
reduction of the gross estate had been reached for purposes of
special use valuation. See, Harl, “‘Stacking’ Deductions for
Special Use Valuation and Minority Discount,” 7 Agric. L. Dig.
9 (1996). I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
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TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, established an
irrevocable trust for their minor daughter. The settlor-father
was a co-trustee of trust, and the trust instrument did not
preclude the settlor-mother from becoming a co-trustee. The
trust instrument provided that the settlors, in their capacities as
trustees, had no power or authority with respect to discretionary
distributions of income or principal from the trust. Moreover, in
their capacities as trustees, the settlors had no power or
authority with respect to the appointment of successor trustees.
The non-settlor trustee, who was the father of the settlor-father
and the grandfather of the beneficiary, had the power to
distribute to the beneficiary so much of the income and
principal of the trust "as he deems proper" for certain purposes,
including the beneficiary's health, education, support and
maintenance. The settlors had a legal obligation to support the
beneficiary as their minor child. The IRS interpreted state law
as imposing a fiduciary duty on the non-settlor trustee to act
independently of the settlors in exercising the discretionary
power of distribution. The IRS ruled that,  provided there was
no implied or express understanding or agreement that the non-
settlor trustee would exercise the power of distribution other
than independently of the settlors, the trust property would not
be included in the gross estate of either settlor under I.R.C. §
2036 or § 2038. Ltr. Rul. 9834004, May 14, 1998; Ltr. Rul.
9834005, May 14, 1998.
UNIFIED CREDIT. The decedent’s will bequeathed in trust
to the surviving spouse “an amount equal to the unified credit
as provided under the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and
as existing at the time of my death.…” The surviving spouse
petitioned a Florida court for an interpretation of that bequest
and the court ruled that the decedent intended the bequest to
equal "the largest amount permitted to pass at Decedent's death
that will not result in the imposition of a Federal Estate Tax
with respect to his estate, after allowing for transfers made
during his lifetime and any credits and deductions permitted to
enable his estate to take full advantage of the maximum value
of assets sheltered by the unified credit provision of the Internal
Revenue Code." The IRS ruled that it was not necessarily
bound by the state court ruling, citing Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch , 387 U.S. 456 (1967); however, the IRS ruled that the
state court ruling was an accurate interpretation of the will
under state law and would apply for federal estate tax purposes.
Ltr. Rul. 9834027, May 26, 1998.
VALUATION. The decedent owned a residence as joint
tenant with a sister. Each contributed one-half of the purchase
price. For federal estate tax purposes, the value of the property
included in the decedent’s estate was determined by the estate
by including one-half of the current value less a discount for
lack of control. The IRS ruled that I.R.C. § 2040 had no
provision for discounting the value of estate property held in
joint tenancy for lack of control. FSA 1993-0908-2 (Sept. 8,
1993). See also Estate of Fratini, supra under Joint Tenancy
Property.
The decedent was a majority shareholder in a small closely-
held corporation. The shareholders had entered into a stock
restrictive sale agreement in 1960 which provided for
redemption of stock if a shareholder left the company. In 1987,
as part of the decedent’s plan to leave control of the company
with an employee but to reduce the estate tax burden on the
decedent’s heirs, the decedent executed another stock buy-sell
agreement which established the value of the stock for
redemption by the decedent’s estate. Any unredeemed stock
was to pass to the employee. The corporation was required to
redeem so much of the decedent’s stock as necessary to pay
federal and state taxes on the estate. The Tax Court held that
the agreement was not unenforceable because of I.R.C. § 2703,
because the stock agreement was executed prior to the effective
date of I.R.C. § 2703. However, the buy-sell agreement was
held to be ineffective to set the stock value because the
agreement had a testamentary purpose to pass estate property to
“the natural object” of the decedent’s bounty. Therefore, the
stock was valued at fair market value at the time of the
decedent’s death (actually, in this case the alternate valuation
date was elected). The appellate court reversed, holding that the
employee did not have a sufficiently close relationship with the
decedent to be considered a natural object of the decedent’s
bounty. The court pointed out that the redemption agreement
left the employee with less assets than held before the
decedent’s death. The court upheld the redemption agreement
value of the stock, noting that the value was determined by
objective methods. Estate of Glockner v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,323 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’g, T.C. Memo.
1996-148.
VALUATION OF STOCK. The taxpayer owned shares of
stock in a C corporation which owned one asset, a building
leased to business tenants. The taxpayer made gifts of stock to
family members and valued the stock gifts by first determining
the value of the corporation’s asset less the tax costs of
corporate liquidation and then discounting the fair market value
of the stock by a 25 percent minority interest discount. The Tax
Court found that no sale of the corporation’s asset was
contemplated or necessary and that the donees had the power to
prevent recognition of the built-in gains indefinitely. The Tax
Court held that neither the costs of sale nor the tax costs of
liquidation could reduce the fair market value of the
corporation’s asset for gift tax purposes. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the tax liability of the corporation for
capital gains from the sale of corporate assets was a factor in
determining the fair market value of stock. The appellate court
stated that “a hypothetical willing buyer, having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts, would take some account of
the tax consequences of contingent built-in capital gains on the
sole asset of the corporation at issue in making a sound
valuation of the property.” The appellate court rejected the
argument that, where no corporate liquidation was planned, any
capital gains liability was too speculative.  Eisenberg v.
Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,322 (2d Cir. 1998),
rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1997-483.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AUDITS. The IRS has issued a “Market Segment
Specialization Program Training Guide, Hardwood Timber
Industry, General Program Examination.” The guide is used by
IRS agents as a reference tool for audits. IRPO ¶ 206,501.
The IRS has issued a “Market Segment Specialization
Program Training Guide--Farming, Specific Income Issues and
Farm Cooperatives.” The guide is used by IRS agents as a
reference tool for audits. The guide provides information on
unreported income, gross v. net proceeds, government farm
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programs, cooperatives, livestock, and row crops. IRPO ¶
204,581.
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
REORGANIZATIONS. Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80, as
modified by Rev. Rul. 98-27, I.R.B. 1998-22, 4, addressed a
distribution of the stock of a newly formed controlled
corporation followed by an acquisition of the stock of the
controlled corporation. The IRS has announced that Rev. Rul.
70-225 is no longer determinative following enactment of
Section 1012 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 914-18 as amended in Sec. 6010(c) of
the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, 112 Stat. 790, 813-14, which modified certain provisions
in I.R.C.  §§ 351, 355, and 368. Rev. Rul. 98-44, I.R.B. 1998-
__, __.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayers
had sued a doctor for medical malpractice and obtained a jury
award which included pre-judgment interest. During the appeal
process, the parties executed a settlement agreement for an
amount larger than the jury award but less than the total award
with interest. The taxpayers excluded the entire settlement
proceeds as payment for personal injuries. The court held that,
where a judgment has been obtained and the judgment
contained an award of pre-judgment interest, a pro rata portion
of a settlement must be allocated to pre-judgment interest. The
court held that pre-judgment interest was not part of the
“damages” received for personal injuries and was included in
the taxpayers’ income. Rozpad v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,672 (1st Cir. 1998).
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The IRS has
issued a revenue procedure providing procedures for taxpayers
to make the election under I.R.C. § 198 to deduct any qualified
environmental remediation expenditure (QERE). A "qualified
environmental remediation expenditure" is any expenditure that
is otherwise chargeable to the capital account and that is paid or
incurred in connection with the abatement or control of
hazardous substances as a qualified contaminated site.
However, under I.R.C. § 198(b)(2) a QERE does not include
any expenditure for property subject to an allowance for
depreciation, except that the portion of the allowance for
depreciation of such property that is otherwise allocated to a
qualified contaminated site is treated as a QERE. Rev. Proc.
98-47, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*The taxpayer was a
dentist and purchased a farm to operate an Arabian horse
breeding activity. The activity produced seven straight years of
losses; however, the court held that the activity was operated
with the intent to make a profit, based on the following factors:
(1) the taxpayer maintained complete and accurate financial
and breeding records; (2) the taxpayer had a business plan to
develop the activity into a profitable business and modified the
plan to reduce expenses; (3) a separate bank account was
maintained; (4) the horses were actively marketed; (5) the
taxpayer sought expert advice on horse breeding and farm
management; (6) the taxpayer put much hard work and long
hours into the activity and seldom used the horses for personal
pleasure; and (7) most of the losses resulted from unforeseen
circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control and the losses
were decreasing.  Morley v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-312.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayer operated
a citrus tree nursery. The trees were destroyed in 1985 as part
of a state citrus canker eradication program and the taxpayer
received $32,000 in compensation for the destroyed trees. The
taxpayer did not claim the proceeds as income on the 1985
return and did not make the election for deferral of gain under
I.R.C. § 1033. The state established a reimbursement program
and the taxpayer applied for additional compensation. The
taxpayer received $1.3 million in 1992 in additional
compensation for the destroyed trees, with $500,000 designated
as interest. The taxpayer used the proceeds to purchase other
farm land, a house and a vacation. None of the proceeds was
used to purchase new trees. The taxpayer claimed only the
interest payment as “other income” and did not include the rest
of the settlement in income. Again, no election under I.R.C. §
1033 was made. The taxpayer argued that, because the gain was
realized in two separate payments, the taxpayer was entitled to
two separate periods in which to make the Section 1033
election. The court held that the statute did not provide for
more than one two year period for purchase of replacement
property; therefore, the second payment did not start a new two
year replacement period. Because the replacement property was
purchased more than two years after the original compensation
award payment, no deferral of gain was allowed. The court
noted that the taxpayer could have made the election with the
first payment and sought an extension of the two year
replacement period to allow the taxpayer to take advantage of
the deferral when the second payment was received. The court
also held that the farm land, house and vacation were not
eligible replacement property for the destroyed citrus trees. In
re Mahon, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,684 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1998).
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in August 1998, the
weighted average is 6.51 percent with the permissible range of
5.86 to 6.90 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable range) and
5.86 to 7168 percent (90 to 110 percent permissable range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C.
§ 412(c)(7).  Notice 98-44, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
RENTAL ACTIVITY. The taxpayer was hired by movie
production companies to provide carpentry services. As part of
the compensation, the taxpayer charged actual expenses,
including rental of the taxpayer’s tools. The taxpayer claimed
all of the expenses on Schedule C as business expenses,
resulting in a net loss. The expenses included car and truck use,
legal and professional fees, office expenses, supplies, taxes and
licenses, meals and entertainment, equipment rental, home
office, location travel, telephone and union dues. The IRS
argued alternatively (1) the taxpayer’s leasing of the tools was a
passive activity, disallowing losses or (2) the expenses were
reimbursed employee expenses, deductible only on Schedule A.
The court held that the leasing of the tools was not a passive
activity because the tools were a necessary part of the services
provided by the taxpayer. The court also held that the taxpayer
materially participated in the activity because the taxpayer
provided services in conjunction with the tool leasing.
However, the court held that only the car and truck, equipment
rental, and location travel expenses pertained to the equipment
leasing activity and were deductible on Schedule C. The
remaining expenses were reimbursed employee expenses
deductible on Schedule A. Welch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-310.
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RETURNS. Under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No.
104-168, § 1210, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) the “timely mailing as
timely filing/paying” rule of I.R.C. § 7502(a) can be met by
using designated private delivery service instead of the U.S.
Postal Service. The IRS has announced that the designation of
four private delivery services in Notice 97-50, I.R.B. 1997-37,
21 remains unchanged. The designation of private delivery
services is made annually on or before September 1 of each
year. Notice 98-47, I.R.B. 1998-__.
The IRS has announced publication of revised Form 943A,
Agricultural Employer’s Record of Federal Tax Liability. The
form is available by phone at 1-800-829-3676 or on the internet
at http://www.ire.ustreas.gov.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a nurse anesthetist and formed a
trust to receive a share in a partnership which had another
anesthetist as a partner. Although the taxpayer performed the
medical services, the amounts distributed by the partnership
were placed in the trust’s bank account. The taxpayer, however,
had control over the funds in the partnership and had control
over the trust bank account. The trust did not file income tax
returns or pay any tax on the partnership distributions. The
court held that the taxpayer was liable for the tax on the
partnership distributions because the amounts were paid to the
taxpayer, the taxpayer had control over the funds at all times,
and the amounts resulted from the services provided to the
partnership by the taxpayer. The appellate decision is
designated as not for publication. Estrada v. Comm’r, 98-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,660 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1997-180.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
SPRAYER. The plaintiff was injured by skin contact with a
disinfectant the plaintiff was spraying on hog farrowing crates.
The bottle on the sprayer carrying the disinfectant separated
from the sprayer and splashed the disinfectant on the plaintiff.
The judge gave a jury instruction on the negligence of the
plaintiff from failing to read the instructions for application of
the disinfectant. The disinfectant instructions stated that the
applicant should wear an impervious apron while applying the
disinfectant. At trial, inconsistent evidence was presented as to
whether the plaintiff was wearing any protective clothing at the
time of the accident. The court held that the jury instruction
was proper  because a fact issue was presented as to whether
the plaintiff had followed the directions for wearing protective
clothing. Wolfe v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir.
1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
COOPERATIVE PER UNIT CAPITAL RETAIN
CERTIFICATES. The debtor was a Texas dairy farmer who
sold milk to a Kansas dairy processing and marketing
cooperative. Part of the milk proceeds was returned to the
debtor in per unit capital retain certificates. The certificates
were subject to assignment restrictions in the cooperative’s
bylaws. The debtor gave the certificates to a bank as security
for an operating loan and the bankruptcy trustee sought
recovery of the certificates as estate property. The trustee
argued that the assignment of the certificates to the bank was
avoidable because of the assignment restrictions in the
cooperative’s bylaws. The bank argued that Texas Bus. &
Commerce Code § 9.318(d) prevented restrictions on
assignment of general intangibles. The court held that the
restrictions were enforceable because the restrictions were
specifically allowed under the Kansas Cooperative Marketing
Act. The court held that the assignment of the certificates to the
bank violated the cooperative bylaws and ordered the
certificates returned to the bankruptcy estate. In re Bonnema,
219 B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
CITATION UPDATES
Holt v. United States, 39 Fed. Cls. 525 (Fed. Cls. 1997)
(estate property basis) see Vol 8, p. 188.
Peracchi v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’g,
T.C. Memo. 1996-191 (corporate contributions) see p. 78
supra.
Purdey v. Comm’r, 39 Fed. Cls. 413 (1997) (hobby losses)
see Vol 8, p. 174.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S., 39 Fed. Cls. (1997), on rem.
from, 92 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.
776 (1997), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 32 Fed. Cl. 80
(1994) (casualty losses) see Vol 8, p. 173.
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Geyer, L., “The Agricultural Lawyers’ Guide to the Internet”
Hamilton, N., “Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered…”
McEowen, R., “Recent Caselaw and Legislative
Developments Concerning Special Use Valuation of Farm and
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Richardson, J., “How a Sole Practitioner Uses the ‘Electronic
Office’ to Maintain a Competitive Law Practice”
Schneider, S., “The Family Farmer in Bankruptcy: Recent
Developments in Chapter 12”
Tanner, G., “Annual Review of Agricultural Law:
Commercial Law Developments”
McGaughey, B., “The Role and Responsibility of an Expert
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Tweeten, L., “Food Security and Farmland Preservation”
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Agricultural Food Products Act and Similar Veggie Libel
Laws”
Note, “Deer and Management: A Comprehensive Analysis of
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FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 4-8, 1999
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1999! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 4-8, 1999
at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a continental
breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee.  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr.
Harl's 465 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be
updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize
tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden"
gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at a
busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Waikoloan Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural
Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Subscribers should have received a brochure in the mail.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 if you would like a brochure.
